China’s Unhappy Neo-leftists

Some 20 years after the Tiananmen Square protests, a new political spectrum has emerged in China with factions on the left and right. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as the pragmatic bearer of economic reform, over time has lost its claim as the sole representation of the country's political ideology, and the pitfalls and shortcomings of economic development have provided space for populist rhetoric.

Aside from liberals on the right side of the political spectrum, the so-called neo-leftists have become a recognizable force in China’s political diversification. With the publication of Unhappy China – The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Internal and External Challenges (Zhongguo bu gaoxing), the neo-leftists have once again entered the stage in an attempt to resuscitate internal debate - perhaps, incidentally, sparking international controversy.

Using the claim that China should assume a more powerful role in international and security affairs while replacing the beneficiaries of the old world order, neo-leftist analysts have once again revealed their inclination toward their own brand of nationalism. Unhappy China was primarily written for an internal audience; yet international overreaction ironically plays into the domestic popularity of their ideas.

A new dynamic in Beijing

This past month, Beijing has seemingly developed a new dynamic in asserting its interests in foreign affairs. China has taken a central position in finding remedies to the financial crisis. During the run-up to the G-20 summit, China’s leadership was unusually outspoken in admonishing the US on the stability of the dollar. Previously, Beijing had suggested that the dollar needed to be gradually replaced as a key currency, while at the same time preparing the yuan as an international trading currency.

In military affairs, particularly with regard to renewed confrontations between Chinese vessels and the US surveillance ship USNS Impeccable, China has asserted its stance on national borders in the South China Sea.

All this should have been music to the ears of the authors of Unhappy China. Published in March, it has, according to China Newsweek (Xinwen Zhoukan), become a national bestseller, with over 480,000 copies sold.

Unhappy China addresses a wide range of domestic and foreign affairs issues but avoids making viable suggestions on how to tackle them. The book was an idée fixe resulting from an informal get-together of the five authors: Huang Jisu, Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Liu Yang and Song Qiang.

Song Qiang was also co-author of the 1996 works China Can Say No and China Can Still Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu / Zhongguo hai keyi shuo bu), two books directed against Japanese and US domination of China’s immediate foreign affairs environment, the lack of self-governance and the perceived dominance of western values.

Wang Xiaodong is the only author that can actually be considered a nationalist ideologue. Since 2005 he has focused on a supposed self-defeating attitude among Chinese elites and intellectuals, which he describes as “reverse nationalism.”

Yet, Wang is also said to pursue a liberal agenda. This hidden endeavor is reflected in his criticism of the centralistic system, sparked by the Chinese government’s soft reaction to the US bombardment of the Chinese Embassy in the Serbian capital Belgrade and its handling of demonstrations in China thereafter.

Both authors, Song and Wang, co-authored another book, China's Path under the Shadow of Globalisation (Quanqiuhua yinyingxia de Zhonguo zhilu), an anti-American sequel to China Can Still Say No. Both became key critics in the debate about China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001.

Generally speaking, Unhappy China seems to be well-marketed and might gain greater, yet dubious currency outside China. The country's international profile has risen since 1996 and the timing to revive ideas might be profitable from a commercial point of view. The book may also be a convenient strategy for keeping neo-leftist goals under discussion. Yet, statements beyond populist assertions are limited.

Professor Zha Daojiong of Beijing University told ISN Security Watch, “A good deal of the book’s substance is dissatisfaction with domestic governance. The authors have a lot to complain about [with just about] everybody they care to identify. They do not offer ways out of the messy situation they see. This is the major problem with this kind of book.”

External or internal agenda?

Even though the authors address a domestic audience, the international debate sparked by the publication is a welcome by-product. China’s Xinhua news agency has made a visible effort to play down the significance of the book.

In particular, the writers’ negative perspective on China’s international affairs has already attracted worldwide media attention, with liberal and pragmatic intellectuals suddenly finding themselves burdened with interview requests. The authors regard occurrences such as the strong criticism of China before and during the 2008 Summer Olympic Games or French President Sarkozy’s meeting of the Dalai Lama as blatant attempts to disregard China’s international standing.

The current financial crisis, according to the authors, was caused by the US and illustrates how corrupt American society has become and how an alternative force is needed to positively reform international order. "Angry youth" are presented as the new national heroes brave enough to address this deplorable state of affairs. Unhappy China also states that the bottom line is that China should stand firm and cease its habit of self-debasement. With China’s strength growing, Beijing should recognise that it has the power to lead the world and break away from western influence.

But in their calls for China to truly see itself as a great power, the writers ignore the country’s foreign policy principles that seek a peaceful rise, soft power and a low profile. Their dismissal of fence-mending is not a feasible option for an economically interdependent China.

Their criticism ignores the fact that the country's constructive role and contribution is wanted and welcomed. The EU’s China strategy papers and the Bush administration’s policy of encouraging Chinese stakeholdership have sought for Beijing to adopt an active position in international affairs. For instance, the international community welcomed China’s naval engagement in the Indian Ocean rather than viewing it  as geopolitical move by Beijing.

As before, the criticism of domestic conditions largely targeted liberal Chinese intellectuals, incompetent officials and those who would suppress conservatism. More deeply rooted are references to the myriad controversies that took place in China last year, especially the tainted milk scandal, which the authors saw as a sign of corruption and the decline of Chinese civilization.

Leftist nationalism?

The assertive nationalist rhetoric behind recent neo-leftist statements appeals to a growing number of people who are dissatisfied with corruption . But why would China’s new left adopt such rhetoric? After all, it is not nationalistic per se. In the past, the country's socialist movement adopted this type of rhetoric as a means to mobilize against the abhorred puppet regime of the Nationalist People Party (Guomindang) and later against foreign aggression from the US and the USSR. In principle, this rhetoric traditionally had a hint of counter-imperialist or post-colonial emancipation and self-assertion.

At later stages, the revolutionary leadership toned down the rhetoric, attempting to replace it with ideology. During the period of economic reform after 1978 Beijing to a great extent gave up external polarization. The reform process relied too heavily on foreign investment and in view of a rising number of challenges, the CCP was increasingly condemned to pragmatism. A policy of moderation replaced ideology and a loosely organized level of political diversification between new left and right filled the empty ideological void.

Some commentators have associated the nationalists with the neo-left camp, stating that nationalist ideology was more compatible with the bloc's ideas. In China, the neo-left has evolved along with the patriotic movement after Tiananmen. By contrast, in China liberals or advocats of democracy are still considered rightist.

Liu Wanyuan, editor-in- chief at the English language magazine NewsChina, told ISN Security Watch: “It is difficult to tell who belongs to which faction. The authors will surely not consider themselves as nationalist or neo-leftist but as patriots.” The feeling is mutual: The country's neo-left lays no claim to them either.

Yet, the ideological agenda still has much in common with the left. The urge for self-determination still stems from a historic need rather than jingoism or anti-globalism as has been the case elsewhere. However, in the recent past, nationalist tendencies have gained momentum when criticism from outside China was perceived as unjust. The authors, well aware of this fact, have taken the opportunity to appeal to this relatively new dynamic of reactive or aggrieved nationalism. Thence critical international reactions will add to the popularity of their ideas.

“Western newspapers seem to miss the reference to the domestic dimension. The authors are reacting to mostly symbolic matters such as the disturbances of the Olympic torch relay," Zha told ISN Security Watch.

"Instead of interpreting the arguments as another representation of Chinese nationalism and dismissing them as such, it would be in the interest of Europe to think of how societies on both sides can reach out to each other to better understand the other’s values.”