@InProceedings{	  basin.ea:modeling:2010,
  abstract	= {We present a framework for modeling adversaries in
		  security protocolanalysis, ranging from a Dolev-Yao style
		  adversary to more powerfuladversaries who can reveal
		  different parts of principals' states duringprotocol
		  execution. Our adversary models unify and generalize
		  manyexisting security notions from both the computational
		  and symbolicsettings.We extend an existing symbolic
		  protocol-verification tool with ouradversary models,
		  resulting in the first tool that systematicallysupports
		  notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key
		  compromiseimpersonation, and adversaries capable of
		  state-reveal queries. In casestudies, we automatically find
		  new attacks and rediscover known attacksthat previously
		  required detailed manual analysis.},
  author	= {David Basin and Cas Cremers},
  booktitle	= {Computer Security - ESORICS 2010},
  language	= {USenglish},
  pages		= {340--356},
  publisher	= {Springer},
  series	= {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  title		= {Modeling and Analyzing Security in the Presence of
		  Compromising Adversaries},
  volume	= 6345,
  year		= 2010,
  user		= {cremersc}
}