@Unpublished{	  montalto.ea:modeling:2009,
  abstract	= {We propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis
		  ofsecurity protocols. The proposed framework allows one to
		  model andreason about attackers that extend the usual
		  Dolev-Yao adversary withexplicit probabilistic statements
		  representing properties of cryptographic primitives and the
		  attacker's (partial) information about secret messages.The
		  expressive power of these probabilistic statements is
		  illustrated, namely by representing a standard security
		  notion likeindistinguishability under chosen plaintext
		  attacks. We present anentropy-based approach to estimate
		  the probability of a successfulattack on a protocol given
		  the prescribed knowledge of the attacker.We prove that, for
		  an attacker whose knowledge increases with the security
		  parameter, computing this quantity is NP-hard in the
		  security parameter.However, we are still able to analyze a
		  few meaningful and illustrative examples.Finally, we obtain
		  a result which may be used toprove that a certain amount of
		  probabilistic knowledge (about theproperties of the
		  cryptography being used) is notenough for allowing an
		  attacker to correctly uncover a secret with non-negligible
		  probability.},
  author	= {Bruno Montalto and Carlos Caleiro},
  language	= {USenglish},
  month		= 03,
  pdf		= {papers/2009/CryptAdv.pdf},
  title		= {Modeling and Reasoning About an Attacker with
		  Cryptanalytical Capabilities},
  year		= 2009,
  user		= {brunoco}
}