@InCollection{ armando.ea:aviss:2002, abstract = {We introduce AVISS, a tool for security protocol analysis that supports the integration of back-ends implementing different search techniques, allowing for their systematic and quantitative comparison and paving the way to their effective interaction. As a significant example, we have implemented three back-ends, and used the AVISS tool to analyze and find flaws in 36 protocols, including 31 problems in the Clark-Jacob's protocol library and a previously unreported flaw in the Denning-Sacco protocol.}, address = {Heidelberg}, author = {Alessandro Armando and David Basin and Mehdi Bouallagui and Yannick Chevalier and Luca Compagna and Sebastian M{\"o}dersheim and Michael Rusinowitch and Mathieu Turuani and Luca Vigan{\`o} and Laurent Vigneron}, booktitle = {Computer-Aided Verification CAV'02}, copyright = {\copyright Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg}, editor = {Ed Brinksma and Kim Guldstrand Larsen}, isbn = {3-540-43997-8}, language = {USenglish}, pages = {349--353}, pdf = {papers/2002/6_AvissCav02.pdf}, ps = {papers/2002/6_AvissCav02.ps.gz}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2404}, title = {The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool}, year = 2002 }