

Formal Methods and Functional Programming

Introduction to Part II

Peter Müller

Chair of Programming Methodology
ETH Zurich

Organization

- Most aspects do not change (lecture times, web page, homework)
- In general, please attend the same exercise session
- Some details have changed:
 - Tuesday 13-15, ETZ G91 (Alex Summers, **English**)
 - Tuesday 13-15, NO D11 (Milos Novacek, English)
 - Tuesday 13-15, NO E11 (Uri Juhasz, English)
 - Wednesday 15-17, IFW A34 (Alex Viand, **German**)
 - Wednesday 15-17, IFW C33 (Cyril Steimer, German)
 - Students previously attending Ralf Sasse's exercise class (CAB G57) can choose either the class in ETZ G91 or any of the Wednesday classes.
 - Students in Joshua Schneider's class (ETZ G91) who wish to remain taught in German can choose either of the Wednesday classes.
- For all organizational issues, please email Alex Summers (alexander.summers@inf.ethz.ch)



Homeworks and Exam

- Homework can be submitted in one of two ways:
 - By email to the appropriate tutor (see course website)
 - By hand in the appropriate box outside room CAB F53.1

Solutions must be received by 11:00 on the Monday after the exercise is published, in order to receive feedback.

- The exam will take place in the exam session
 - See web page for details (coming soon)
- Please check the course website regularly, for announcements
 - <http://www.infsec.ethz.ch/education/ss2014/fmfp>


Recommended Books



- Hanne Riis Nielson and Flemming Nielson:
Semantics with Applications: A Formal Introduction
 - Available from
http://www.daimi.au.dk/~bra8130/Wiley_book/wiley.pdf
- Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen:
Principles of Model Checking


Software Errors Cost Large Amounts of Money

- Software errors cost US economy \$59.5 billion annually (estimate by Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002)
- Software bugs in baggage handling system of the airport of Denver led to damage of around \$1 million per day (for almost a year)
- Explosion of Ariane 5 destroyed satellites worth \$500 million
- In comparison: famous hardware bugs:
 - Pentium bug cost Intel \$500 million
 - Xbox bug cost Microsoft \$1 billion



Software Errors May Cost Lives

- Software error in Therac-25 medical linear accelerator led to overdose, which killed six people
- Rounding error caused Patriot Missile system to ignore an incoming Scud missile; 28 soldiers died
- Many other safety critical systems
 - Controllers in airplanes, cars, trains, etc.
 - Air traffic control systems
 - Nuclear reactor control systems



Traditional Software Engineering

- Describes expected behavior using **natural language** or **semi-formal notations**

- Ambiguities
- Contradictions
- Incompletenesses



- Relies on **testing** to ensure quality
 - *Testing can show the presence of errors, but not their absence.*
[E. Dijkstra]
 - Exhaustive testing possible only for trivial programs
 - Some errors are hard to find / reproduce (data races, deadlocks)
 - Achieving good test coverage is difficult (rare cases)

Alternative: Formal Methods

Formal methods are mathematical approaches to software and system development which support the rigorous specification, design, and verification of computer systems. [FME]

- Programs, programming languages, designs, etc. are **mathematical objects** and can be treated by **mathematical methods**

- Examples from Part I of the course:

- Proving program properties

$$\forall xs, ys, zs. (xs ++ ys) ++ zs = xs ++ (ys ++ zs)$$

- Formalizing language semantics

$$(\lambda x. t) t' \hookrightarrow t[x \leftarrow t']$$

- Proving language properties

$$\text{If } t \hookrightarrow t' \text{ and } A \vdash t :: \tau \text{ then } A \vdash t' :: \tau$$

Example 1: Sorting Function

```
void sort(int[] input)
```

- Informal specification:
Method `sort` sorts the elements of `input` in ascending order

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 - `sort({2})` → `{2}` ✓
 - `sort({2,3,1})` → `{1,2,3}` ✓
 - `sort({2,2,1})` → `{1,2,1}` ✗
 - `sort(null)` → ⚡ ✗

Example 1: Sorting Function—Formal Treatment

- Specification
 - Pre and postcondition in predicate logic (contract)
 - If a is a **non-null array** of integers and in the **state before a call** $\text{sort}(a)$, the elements of a are $e_0 \dots e_n$, then **the call terminates** and immediately after the call, the elements of a , $e'_0 \dots e'_n$, are **a permutation** of $e_0 \dots e_n$ and $\forall i, j \in [0, n]. i < j \Rightarrow e'_i \leq e'_j$.

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- Verification
 - **Prove** that sort satisfies its specification using a **formal semantics of the programming language**
- Observations
 - Specification permits duplicate elements in array:
Test $\text{sort}(\{2, 2, 1\})$ reveals **error in implementation**
 - Specification excludes `null` from the valid arguments to sort :
Test $\text{sort}(\text{null})$ is an **invalid test case**
 - Correctness proof covers **all valid inputs**, not just selected test cases

Example 2: Zune Bug



- Zune 30 did not work on Dec. 31, 2008
- Official fix: drain battery and recharge after midday on Jan. 01, 2009

```
//-----  
// Split total days since  
// Jan. 01, ORIGINYEAR  
// into year, month and day  
//-----  
BOOL ConvertDays(UINT32 days, ...) {  
    int year = ORIGINYEAR; /* =1980 */  
  
    while (days > 365) {  
        if (IsLeapYear(year)) {  
            if (days > 366) {  
                days -= 366; year += 1;  
            }  
        } else {  
            days -= 365; year += 1;  
        }  
    }  
    ... }  
}
```

Example 2: Zune Bug—Formal Treatment

- Prove termination formally
- Repetition: Sufficient condition for termination of recursive functions: Arguments are smaller along a well-founded order
- Similar technique for loops
- Zune example:
 - Termination measure: variable days
 - Well-founded order: $<$ with lower bound 365 (loop condition)
 - Error: measure not decreased if `IsLeapYear(year)` and `days==366`

```
while (days > 365) {  
    if (IsLeapYear(year)) {  
        if (days > 366) {  
            days -= 366; year += 1;  
        }  
    } else {  
        days -= 365; year += 1;  
    }  
}
```

Example 3: Deadlock

- Threads are synchronized via locks
- Interleaved execution of `a.transfer(b,n)` and `b.transfer(a,m)` might **deadlock**
- Multi-threaded programs are **extremely hard to test**

```
class Account {  
    int balance;  
  
    void transfer(Account to, int amount) {  
        acquire this;  
        acquire to;  
        this.balance -= amount;  
        to.balance += amount;  
        release this;  
        release to;  
    }  
}
```

Example 3: Deadlock—Formal Treatment (1)

- Prevent deadlocks by **acquiring locks in ascending order**
- **Prove absence of deadlocks** by:
 - Defining an order on locks
 - Proving for each acquire `o` that `o` is **above all other locks** held by the current thread

```
class Account {  
    int balance;  
    int number; // unique account number  
  
    void transfer(Account to, int amount) {  
        if (this.number < to.number) {  
            acquire this;  
            acquire to;  
        } else {  
            acquire to;  
            acquire this;  
        }  
        this.balance -= amount;  
        to.balance += amount;  
        release this;  
        release to;  
    }  
}
```

Example 3: Deadlock—Formal Treatment (2)

- Alternative approach: state space exploration
 - Enumerate all possible states of a system
 - Check properties on the states and their transitions
 - Absence of deadlock: check for each state that there is a way to reach the terminal state

Example 3: Deadlock—Formal Treatment (2)


- Alternative approach: **state space exploration**
 - Enumerate all possible states of a system
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- Main problem: size of state space
- Explore **abstractions** of real program (here, balance does not matter)
- Explore state space for **limited executions**
 - Small number of threads (here, two are sufficient)
 - Small number of objects (here, two are sufficient)
 - Small number of context switches (here, one is sufficient)

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 - Small number of threads (here, two are sufficient)
 - Small number of objects (here, two are sufficient)
 - Small number of context switches (here, one is sufficient)
- State space exploration typically gives **no correctness guarantee**
 - Similar to testing
 - Very effective in practice

Example 4: Needham-Schroeder Protocol


- Establish a common secret over an insecure channel
 1. Alice sends random number N_A to Bob, encrypted with Bob's public key:
 $\langle A, N_A \rangle_B$
 2. Bob sends random number N_B to Alice, encrypted with Alice's public key:
key: $\langle N_A, N_B \rangle_A$
 3. Alice responds with $\langle N_B \rangle_B$



- Intruders may:
 - Intercept, store, and replay messages
 - Initiate or participate in runs of the protocol
 - Decrypt messages only if encrypted with intruder's public key
- Error: intruder can pretend to be another party

Example 4: Needham-Schroeder Protocol— Formal Treatment

- State space exploration: **enumerate protocol runs**
 - Develop formal model of **intruder as non-deterministic program**
 - Simplifications: two agents, one intruder with limited memory
 - Check whether there is a protocol run such that agent believes to talk to other agent, but in fact **talks to intruder**
- Error was found this way 17 years after protocol was published



Observations: Formal Specification

- Use mathematical notations to describe:
 - **Assumptions** about the environment (e.g., intruder model)
 - **Requirements** for the system (desired properties, e.g., deadlock freedom)
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 - **System design** to accomplish these requirements (e.g., program code)
- Requirements
 - **Safety properties**: Something bad will never happen
 - Functional behavior of sort (no “incorrect” return-values)
 - Absence of certain faults (e.g., null-pointer exception, buffer overflow)
 - **Liveness properties**: Something good will happen eventually
 - Termination of `ConvertDays`
 - Each request gets served eventually
 - **Non-functional requirements**
 - Resource consumption, e.g., memory usage
 - Runtime, e.g., realtime guarantees

Observations: Formal Verification

- Use formal logic to:
 - **Validate specifications** by checking consistency
Example: termination measure uses well-founded order
 - **Prove** that design satisfies requirements under given assumptions
Example: code does not deadlock
 - **Prove** that a more detailed design implements a more abstract one (refinement)
Example: protocol implementation refines protocol specification

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Example: protocol implementation refines protocol specification
- **Proof methods**
 - **Deductive**: proof system
Example: prove termination in a program logic
 - **Algorithmic**: state space exploration (model checking)
Example: enumerate and check protocol runs

Formal Methods: Ingredients

- Underlying programming/modeling system
 - Programming language with precise (formal) semantics or
 - Modeling language for constructing formal models of software
- Specification language
 - Desired properties expressed as logical formulas in a formal logic
 - Precise meaning for “the system satisfies a property”
- Proof method
 - Method to establish or refute that a system satisfies a property
 - When not satisfied, may also provide a counterexample
- Tool support
 - For specification and verification
 - Proofs are often simple, but long and tedious (unlike in mathematics)
 - Tools needed to check details, e.g., theorem provers and model checkers

Benefits of Formal Methods

- Strong guarantees
 - Detect faults with **greater certainty** than testing
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- Universality
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 - Hardware (e.g., refinement proof between gate and transistor design)

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 - Programming languages / new features (e.g., type safety proof)
 - Hardware (e.g., refinement proof between gate and transistor design)
- Didactic value: Studying formal methods:
 - Leads to **deep understanding of semantics** of programs and specifications
 - Increases awareness of **subtle issues** of programs, languages, etc.
 - **Makes you a better engineer!**

Success Stories

- Paris driverless metro (Meteor)
 - Safety-critical system
 - Pilot software developed through stepwise refinement in B
 - Most detailed design translated automatically to 30,000 lines of Ada
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 - Windows device drivers running in kernel mode should respect API
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 - SLAM inspects C code using a combination of model checking and theorem proving
- Airbus 380 flight controller
 - Safety-critical system
 - Static analysis of 500,000 lines of C code
 - Proved absence of runtime errors (e.g., buffer overflows)

Limitations

- Incorrect specifications
 - Formal methods per se **do not guarantee correctness**
 - Verifying the wrong specification is useless
 - It is difficult to get specifications right
- Technical limitations
 - Almost all interesting properties are **undecidable**, in general
 - Many tools quickly reach limits (scope, computing resources)
- Many applications of formal methods require **specialist users**
 - Strong background in mathematics / training in formal modeling
 - Some tools try to hide this complexity from users (research topic)
- Application of formal methods is **expensive**
 - But testing is expensive, too

Formal Methods and Testing

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 - Detect errors in environment (e.g., compiler)

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- Formal methods and testing complement each other
- Testing still necessary
 - Validate specifications
 - Test properties not formally proven (e.g., performance)
 - Detect errors in environment (e.g., compiler)
- Formal methods aid testing
 - Derive test cases, test data, and test oracles from specifications
 - Increase test coverage
 - Replace (infinitely) many tests

Course Outline—Part II

- Focus: formal methods for (stateful) software
 - Imperative programs and languages
 - Software designs

1. Formal semantics of imperative programming languages

- Operational semantics
- Axiomatic semantics (Hoare logic)

2. Modeling and state space exploration techniques

- Constructing models of software designs
- Temporal logic and model checking

C: Expression Evaluation

```
int print(char* text) {  
    printf("%s\n", text);  
    return 5;  
}
```

```
print("One")+print("Two");
```

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```

One
Two

Two
One

In C and C++,
evaluation order of
expressions is **undefined**

- Precedence and associativity define rules for structuring expressions
- But do not define operand evaluation order

Haskell and SML: Evaluation

Haskell

```
const :: Int -> Int  
const x = 1
```

```
const ( 2 'div' 0 )
```

SML

```
fun const (x: int):int = 1;
```

```
const ( 2 div 0 );
```

Haskell and SML: Evaluation

Haskell

```
const :: Int -> Int  
const x = 1
```

```
const ( 2 'div' 0 )
```

```
1
```

SML

```
fun const (x: int):int = 1;
```

```
const ( 2 div 0 );
```

```
uncaught exception divide by zero
```

- Haskell uses **lazy evaluation**:
Arguments are evaluated when they are needed
- SML uses **eager evaluation**:
Arguments are evaluated when function is applied

Java: Dynamic Method Binding

```
class C1 {  
    int x = 5;  
    public void inc1( )  
        { this.inc2( ); }  
    private void inc2( )  
        { x++; }  
}
```

```
class CS1 extends C1 {  
    public void inc2( )  
        { inc1( ); }  
}
```

```
CS1 cs = new CS1();  
cs.inc2( );  
System.out.println(cs.x);
```

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}
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```
CS1 cs = new CS1();  
cs.inc2( );  
System.out.println(cs.x);
```

```
class C2 {  
    int x = 5;  
    public void inc1( )  
        { this.inc2( ); }  
    protected void inc2( )  
        { x++; }  
}
```

```
class CS2 extends C2 {  
    public void inc2( )  
        { inc1( ); }  
}
```

```
CS2 cs = new CS2();  
cs.inc2( );  
System.out.println(cs.x);
```


Java: Class Initialization

```
class C {  
    public static int x;  
}
```

```
class D {  
    public static char y;  
    ...  
}
```

```
C.x = 0;  
D.y = '?';  
System.out.println(C.x);
```

Java: Class Initialization

```
class C {  
    public static int x;  
}
```

```
class D {  
    public static char y;  
  
    static { C.x = C.x + 1; }  
}
```

```
C.x = 0;  
D.y = '?';  
System.out.println(C.x);
```

Why Formal Semantics?

- Programming language design
 - Formal verification of language properties
 - Reveal ambiguities
 - Support for standardization
- Implementation of programming languages
 - Specification for developing compilers
 - Generation of interpreters
 - Portability (abstract description of language semantics)
 - Evaluation of new programming language features
- Reasoning about programs
 - Formal verification of program properties

Programming Language Properties

- **Type safety:**

In each execution state, a variable of type `T` holds a value of type `T` (or a subtype of `T`)

- Very important question for language designers

- Example:

If `String` is a subtype of `Object`, should `String[]` be a subtype of `Object[]`?

Programming Language Properties

- **Type safety:**

In each execution state, a variable of type T holds a value of type T (or a subtype of T)

- Very important question for language designers

- Example:

If `String` is a subtype of `Object`, should `String[]` be a subtype of `Object[]`?

```
void m(Object[] oa) {  
    oa[0]=new Integer(5);  
}
```

```
String[] sa=new String[10];  
m(sa);  
String s = sa[0];
```

Compiler Optimization

- Common subexpression elimination

```
d = a * Math.sqrt(c);  
e = b * Math.sqrt(c);
```

```
double tmp=Math.sqrt(c);  
d = a * tmp;  
e = b * tmp;
```

Compiler Optimization

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d = a * Math.sqrt(c);  
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double tmp=Math.sqrt(c);  
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```

- Optimization works only for side-effect free expressions

```
d = a * c++;  
e = b * c++;
```

```
double tmp = c++;  
d = a * tmp;  
e = b * tmp;
```

Formal Verification

```
/* returns the  
   factorial of n */  
int fac(int n) {  
    if (n>1)  
        return n*fac(n-1);  
    else  
        return 1;  
}
```


Formal Verification

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fac(17);

-288522240

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```

fac(17);

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- Verification could run by induction
- Induction hypothesis:
 $n \geq 0 \Rightarrow \text{fac}(n) = n!$
- Induction base is trivial
- Induction step requires to prove $n \times (n-1)! = n!$ which is not the case in computer arithmetic (for ints)

Three Kinds of Programming Language Semantics

- Operational semantics
 - Describes execution on an **abstract machine**
 - Describes **how** the effect is achieved; abstractly, how the program runs
- Denotational semantics (not in this course)
 - Programs are regarded as **functions** in a mathematical domain
 - Describes **only the effect**, not how it is obtained
- Axiomatic semantics
 - **Specific properties** of the effect of executing a program are expressed
 - Some aspects of the computation may be **ignored**

Operational Semantics

```
y := 1;  
while not(x=1) do ( y := x*y; x := x-1 )
```

- “First we assign 1 to y , then we test whether x is 1 or not. If it is then we stop and otherwise we update y to be the product of x and the previous value of y and then we decrement x by 1. Now we test whether the new value of x is 1 or not...”
- Two kinds of operational semantics
 - Natural Semantics (coarse-grained view of execution)
 - Structural Operational Semantics (fine-grained view of execution)

Axiomatic Semantics

```
y := 1;  
while not(x=1) do ( y := x*y; x := x-1 )
```

- “If $x = n$ holds before the program is executed then $y = n!$ will hold when the execution terminates (if it terminates)”
- Two kinds of axiomatic semantics
 - Partial correctness (properties modulo program termination)
 - Total correctness (prove termination as additional property)

Which Semantics to Use—Selection Criteria

Constructs of the language

- Imperative
- Functional
- Concurrent
- Object-oriented
- Non-deterministic
- etc.

Application of the semantics

- Understanding the language
- Program verification
- Prototyping
- Compiler construction
- Program analysis
- etc.

Focus of this Course

- We discuss the major approaches to semantics for a small imperative language (called IMP)
 - Similarities and differences between semantics
 - Important theoretical results
- Operational Semantics
 - Natural and structural operational semantics of IMP
- Axiomatic Semantics
 - Hoare logic for IMP