Nationalism and Democracy: Competing or Complementary Logics?

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Upon initial consideration, the logics of nationalism and democracy seem to be contradictory. Nationalism appears to be predicated upon a doctrine of exclusivity, whereas democracy appears to be based on an inclusivist one. Upon careful contemplation, however, one notices that, historically, these two phenomena have frequently coexisted; even today, democratic regimes seem to exist and thrive (almost exclusively) within nation-states. The aim of this review is to bring together and discuss those works that have addressed the question of whether nationalism and democracy constitute complementary or competing logics. The debate operates on both a theoretical/normative level, and an empirical level. For a first group of scholars, democracy cannot exist without nationalism; it is thought that a certain degree of (cultural) homogeneity is needed for a political system to work. These scholars argue that a common national identity fosters solidarity and trust and gives human beings a sense of belonging. Empirical studies have revealed that (cultural) heterogeneity leads to the deterioration of trust, political participation, and the overall solvency of the welfare state. Those who emphasize the contradictory logics of these two concepts have not found such correlations in their empirical findings—revealing that multicultural states are also prone to success. Hence, for them, there is no reason to exclude people from democratic decision-making processes on grounds of their nationality, something that undermines the very principles of democracy. Even worse, it is argued that the fusion of nationalistic and democratic principles has led to some of the deadliest conflicts in modern history.

Introduction

Upon initial consideration, the logics of nationalism and democracy seem to be contradictory. Nationalism appears to be predicated upon a doctrine of exclusivity, whereas democracy seems to be based on an inclusivist one. Upon careful contemplation, however, one notices that historically these two phenomena have frequently coexisted; even today, democratic regimes exist and thrive (almost exclusively) within nation-states. For a first group of scholars, democracy cannot exist without nationalism; it is thought that a certain degree of (cultural) homogeneity is needed for a political system to work. These scholars argue that a common national identity fosters solidarity and trust and gives human beings a sense of belonging. For those who emphasize the contradictory logics of these two concepts there is no reason to exclude people from democratic decision-making processes on grounds of nationality, something that undermines the very principles of democracy.

To be clear, this review is not concerned with the countless approaches and studies in the fields of nationalism and democracy, which are already quite numerous. As Spillman and Faeges (2005) rightly observe, there are almost as many definitions of nationalism as there are scholars in this field. Providing detailed definitions of nationalism and democracy at this point would also be problematic insofar as the differing uses of these terms—especially in the case of nationalism—is one of the reasons why the question of this paper’s title is answered differently by different researchers.

While democracy can also be defined in various ways, and can be approached from different perspectives, virtually all scholars agree that it is a system of government in which political sovereignty is retained by ‘the people,’ and exercised by them either directly or through their representatives. The question, then—the one that leads to heated debates—is this: whom do we mean by ‘the people?’ While some scholars consider the entire world population to be ‘the people,’ and underscore the notion that everyone has the right to be part of a democratic regime, others point out that a world democracy is simply not imaginable for reasons of feasibility. Even more importantly, they argue that a certain degree of homogeneity is necessary for a democracy to work. It is here that nationalism comes in, the problems and obscurities begin, and the crucial questions that are discussed in this paper start to be addressed: What does (cultural) homogeneity contribute to the functioning of democracy? What characteristics, exactly, need to be homogeneous for democracy to work? Does (cultural) heterogeneity pose a problem for the functioning of democracy? Or might it be that (cultural) homogeneity undermines the basic principles of democracy?

Nationalism has become part of this discussion because it is often considered as a phenomenon that creates or presupposes homogeneity. Asserting that nationalism and democracy constitute complementary logics could simply mean that people have to recognize themselves as a sovereign body before they

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1 I like to thank Hanspeter Kriesi, Nenad Stojanovic and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions.
can build up a democracy. Starting from here, the question would appear to be as follows: Are there any additional elements that need to be shared by the subjects of a democracy, and if so, which elements and how many? Scholars often differentiate between the ideal types of civic and ethnic nationalisms. For the purpose of our present inquiry, the adherents of the first form of nationalism are those who argue that people of a functioning democratic regime share some democratic and liberal values, while those who espouse the second form require common cultural traits in the narrow sense such as language or religion (see Brubaker 1999 and Helbling 2008: 41-5). It suffices to say, however, that there are different forms of nationalism, and that these different forms invoke different elements in their standards for homogeneity.²

Before we deal in more detail with these arguments, we need to delimit the scope of this review. One difficulty in reviewing the topic that is addressed here is that only very few works treat it explicitly and specifically refer to the terms “nationalism” and “democracy” (see, for example, Nodia 1994; Spencer and Wollman 2002: ch.5). As a consequence, this review cannot be organized around seminal books and articles that address the question posed in the title of this paper. By contrast, there is an enormous literature on very similar topics using different concepts. Complicating matters still further—unlike most other topics— this research field spans several levels from normative/theoretical debates to empirical studies and encompasses examples and case studies from different world regions.

It is therefore important to clarify how this paper will approach these questions—stating which aspects will be discussed, and which aspects, though (sometimes tightly) related to the questions that are raised here, must be treated only tangentially. Figure 1 gives an overview of the various parts of the debate that treat the interrelationship between nationalism and democracy and the question of what cultural homogeneity contributes to the functioning of democracy. First, we have a range of works that are at the centre of the following discussion and encompass debates on normative principles and general laws (A). This part of the debate is mostly led by political theorists and, accordingly, is focused on theoretical and normative arguments. Given the general and abstract nature of this part of the debate, the conclusions that can be drawn are valid for different empirical cases. As a matter of fact, however, the examples that are used to illustrate the arguments are mostly drawn from the Western world.

Second, we have a strand of the literature that discusses how cultural heterogeneity can be avoided and/or regulated by institutional provisions (B). This field can be divided into two parts: One group (B1) of researchers is particularly concerned with citizenship laws and their regulatory function in either fostering or inhibiting a nation’s cultural heterogeneity. More particularly, these studies explore the degree of openness of citizenship regimes and ask which conditions for granting citizenship are acceptable and who should be granted citizenship rights (see, for example, Carens 1989; Hammar 1990; Bauböck 1994; Rubio-Marín 2000; Kostakopoulou 2008). A second group (B2) focuses more on how manifest cultural heterogeneity can be regulated and potential negative effects of cultural heterogeneity avoided by means of specific institutional provisions (consociationalism, power sharing, minority rights, electoral systems, federalism etc.) (see, for example, Lijphart 1977; Kymlicka 1995; Reilly 2001; Keating 2001; Horowitz 2003; Caminal and Requejo 2008). While the studies on citizenship regulations mainly refer to Western nation-states in their empirical discussions, the works on institutional provisions include a large variety of cases from different world regions.

![Figure 1](image-url)  
**Figure 1:** Debates on nationalism/cultural homogeneity and democracy

A third group of researchers is more specifically concerned with empirically observable effects of cultural heterogeneity, citizenship regulations, and institutional arrangements (C). They test whether or not it is true what political theorists have stipulated, namely that a certain degree of cultural homogeneity is needed for a democratic system to function and measure the impact of institutional arrangements on the interrelationship between cultural heterogeneity and the functioning of democratic regimes. Most often researchers in this field are concerned with established democracies and measure the impact of cultural heterogeneity on social phenomena such as general trust, solidarity, political participation, etc. (see, for example, Alesina et al. 1999, 2002; Glaeser et al. 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Vigdor 2004; Leigh 2006a,b; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Sorkoa et al. 2006; Putnam 2007; Hooghe et al. 2008; Crepaz (forthcoming))

Many works in this field can easily be attributed to one of the sub-debates in Figure 1. On the other hand, there are many studies that treat several elements at the same time, and there is hardly any contribution to this debate that focuses exclusively on one or the other aspect. A lot of works focus on normative aspects but still use empirical examples to illustrate their arguments. And there is hardly any empirical study that does not discuss its findings in the light of more general theoretical considerations. These connections are depicted by the arrows in Figure 1. Those are not causal arrows in the narrow sense, but indicate the impact a sub-debate and especially the conclusions

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² In the remaining part of this paper I will use the term ‘cultural homogeneity’, using the term ‘cultural’ in a very broad sense and without implying that any specific characteristics or traits are homogeneous.
that are drawn from it have on other sub-debates. For example, debates on citizenship regulations are very much influenced by theoretical/normative debates concerning the acceptability and desirability of cultural heterogeneity. On the other hand, empirical findings from studies on the effects of restrictive and/or generous citizenship politics are also taken into account when normative concerns are debated. Despite these (partly strong) interrelationships, the distinctions I make in Figure 1 are still useful as they serve as a heuristic tool and thus help us to differentiate the various aspects of this debate, to delimit the following discussion and to specify the topics of possible forthcoming reviews. It becomes clear that the following discussion is not so much about the question of how to organize a culturally heterogeneous democracy and the empirical effects of cultural heterogeneity on the functioning of a democracy; it is much more about the theoretical and normative questions of whether cultural homogeneity is advantageous or necessary for the functioning of a democracy or undermines the very principles of democracy.

Before we continue, some clarification concerning terms and concepts that will be used in addition to the main concepts of nationalism and democracy are necessary. The following discussion is partly related to the everlasting liberal-communitarian debate: Do individual rights and interests count more than those of communities, and is society primarily made up of isolated rational individuals or is an individual person primarily part of a group? In the early 1990s, this general debate started to focus on the concrete issues of minority rights and citizenship, and thus began to address the place of ‘community’ in modern societies in the context of nationalism (Norman 2006, 2-3; Yack 1995, 166). Adherents of liberal nationalism sought to combine the logics of liberalism and nationalism and, more precisely, the ideas that an individual person is a rational actor and a social human being. In a sense, this pattern of thinking served as an attempt ‘to translate’ nationalist arguments into liberal language’ (Tamir 1993, 14).

So, why not focus this investigation on exploring the compatibility of nationalism and liberalism? To a certain extent, the following discussion will include the concept of liberalism anyway. Nowadays, democracy is often considered a form of government that adheres to liberal values—thus, the idea of a ‘liberal democracy’ is largely implied when talking about democratic regimes. On the other hand, it is true that the concepts of ‘nationalism’ and ‘democracy’ are situated at different analytical levels—the first identifying an ideology and the second a political regime. However, this review is not concerned with the philosophical question of the interdependence of community and individuality; as it becomes clear in Figure 1, this debate is much more related to the question of the functioning of (liberal, democratic) states.

As I have already mentioned above, relatively few works refer to the term “nationalism” when they treat the questions we are interested in here. Especially, the terms “nation” and “nationality” are also quite often used. It goes without saying that these terms refer to different concepts and ideas. Nonetheless, in debates on the topic discussed here they are often used to refer to the same general mechanisms: While nationalism is a phenomenon that creates or presupposes homogeneity, a nation can be considered as a homogeneous group and nationality as an attribute that indicates the cultural similarity of a person. As the following works have not been chosen on the basis of the terms they use but with regard to the questions they address, studies that use other terms than nationalism have also been included.

The following review is structured as follows: I first discuss those works that emphasize the complementary logics. The first section will make clear that at least originally the ideas of sovereignty and equality where part of both concepts of nationalism and democracy. The ensuing two parts encompass works that are not so much concerned with commonalities of nationalism and democracy but more radically argue that nationalism is necessary for a democratic regime to function. Nationalism gives human beings a sense of belonging and fosters solidarity, trust, and participation. In the second part of this paper, authors who highlight the competing logics will be discussed. A first group of people doubts that nationalism leads to more solidarity and trust within society. Others much more radically warn of the exclusionary and even deadly consequences of democratic regimes that embrace nationalistic ideologies. And, finally, there is a third group of scholars who criticize the moral consequences of nationalist exclusion. The conclusion will make clear that such a clear cut between complementary and competing logics oversimplifies the arguments, that the debate is often more a matter of degree than of completely opposite positions and that nationalism and democracy might also be considered as mutually dependent logics.

Part I: The Complementary Logic

Sovereignty and equality

For Greenfeld (1992, 10) “[n]ationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon.” The French Revolution is often considered as the starting point of this close relationship. For Brubaker (1992, 39–49) the French Revolution consisted of four revolutions, two of them being the democratic and the national revolutions. Both of these pursued the same aims: They sought, on the one hand, to abolish authoritarian rule by creating fundamental equality among the people and, on the other hand, to establish self-determination of the people, locating the sovereignty within the people. The closeness of these two concepts can be explained by the fact that the term ‘nation’ was used almost interchangeably with the term ‘people.’ Nationalism was thus mainly a principle according to which the ‘people’—and not God or a king—ruled as the sovereign body. This has made nations different from other kinds of collectivities, such as religious groups or social classes. Although these groups might also have cultural boundaries and collective identities, they do not constitute sovereign bodies.

3 If, for example, Miller (1995, 11) argues that the idea of nationality contains the proposition that nations are ethical communities, he refers to the idea that groups sharing the same national characteristics (and are thus culturally homogeneous) are ethical communities (see below).
In the aftermath of the French Revolution the question emerged of what, exactly, was understood by popular sovereignty—especially in the light of the fact that democracy not only stands for sovereignty and equality, but also for political rights and participation. According to Sewell (1988) and Hondt (1995) some of the revolutionary thinkers (such as Sieyès) were reluctant democrats, who preferred that public service be performed by an enlightened elite. For Robespierre, by contrast, popular sovereignty meant active participation by the hitherto excluded. In that sense, Robespierre’s vision of democracy went much further than nationalism (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 128). At least at the beginning of the revolution, Robespierre attacked everyone who sought to make a distinction between active and passive citizens, promoted democracy from below, and was a proponent of the accountability of institutions to the people. Contrary to those revolutionaries who simply intended to plant extended rights on a passive crowd of people, Robespierre preferred that this crowd claim its own rights. These different interpretations of popular sovereignty already point to the tensions that might exist between democracy and nationalism.

According to Greenfeld (1992, 6), it was in early 16th-century England that the word ‘nation’ began to merge with the idea of the sovereign people. Before, ‘nation’ stood for the political, cultural and social elite, namely, the representatives of secular and religious potentates of the Church Council. Later, it was applied to the people of the country and subsequently made synonymous with the word ‘people.’ This effectively made the ‘people’ the new ‘elite.’ As Greenfeld (1992, 6) points out, prior to its nationalization, the term ‘people’ referred to the lower classes of a particular region. The elevation of the people to a nation made them the bearers of sovereignty and the basis of political solidarity. The people—formerly stratified along status—were now perceived as essentially homogeneous. In other words, the emergence of nation was closely coupled with the idea that the legitimacy of the state ‘descended’ no longer from God, but from the people. Since the label ‘nation’ was attached to a specific people of a certain territory, the concept of nation referred not only to the sovereignty of a people but also to its uniqueness.

At first sight, this Janus-faced definition of nationalism (or nation)—universalism and particularism—might appear paradoxical. While nationalism goes hand in hand with the universalistic doctrines of sovereignty, equality, and democracy, these principles apply only to the people who belong to a particular nation. In other words, only those persons who are part of the nation belong to the sovereign body, profit from equal rights, and are allowed to participate in the democratic processes. According to Anderson’s (1991 [1983], 6) seminal definition, a nation is a community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. This also implies, however, that only those who are part of the people, and represent their own interests, can be in power (Ringmar 1998, 535-37). Nationalism plays a crucial role in the modern discourse of political legitimacy, since the state needs to fit with and serve the interest of the people in order to be legitimized: ‘To ‘fit with’ the people meant that the boundaries of the state matched those of the nation—an important aspect of the movement towards compact and contiguous territories—and also that the purposes of the state matched the interests of its citizens—conceived not only as individuals but also as a singular nation or confederation of such nations’ (Calhoun 1997, 69-70).

To clearly delimit the nation and, even more importantly, to make the nation part of one’s individual identity, the concept of citizenship becomes increasingly crucial. Citizenship can be defined as referring to a relation between governmental agents and whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their connection with the government in question. This relation can be thought of as a contract, involving transactions that cluster around mutual rights and obligations—drawing visible lines between insiders and outsiders (Tilly 1999, 252-53). Citizenship is understood as an attribute of the individual, and because this attribute is the same for everyone, nationality makes all individuals potentially equal. Consequently, citizenship seems to erase structural inequalities. The new nation-states integrated all of the major exclusionary modes that were previously organized on different social levels, and fostered internal integration and homogenization. Thus, the emerging national citizenship was no longer confined to the members of certain families or persons of high social status—it was extended to the lower classes (Bendix and Rokkan 1971; Bendix 1977). Naim (1977, 41) formulates this idea as follows: ‘The arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes […] Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably populist in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political life.’

Demands for equality did not result uniquely from economic dissatisfaction, as is suggested by Marxist theory. Indeed, Marxism concentrates on one of the major movements in the 19th-century—socialism—but completely ignores the second one, namely that of nationalism. As Bendix (1977) argues, the distribution and redistribution of rights and duties were actually the result of the political alienation of the working class, and their rising awareness of not having a recognized position in the national community. Such distributive processes might be influenced by the structure of society—as the Marxian argument runs—but they are also affected ‘by conceptions of what the proper distribution in the national community ought to be, and by the give and take of the political struggle’ (Bendix 1977, 88).

While citizenship initially excluded men who were socially and economically dependent, as well as women, such restrictions were gradually reduced in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, until eventually, all adults were classified as citizens. According to Marshall’s (1950) famous trichotomy, citizenship rights successively came to include civic, political, and social rights. Marshall’s (1950) theory enables us to unpack the various aspects of citizenship rights and, more importantly, to comprehend their integrative function in nation-states were capitalist development has led to class inequalities. Indeed, we are able to reach the conclusion that citizenship rights foster a sense of community based on loyalty to a nation that is a common possession (see also Kymlicka 1995, 179-181).
The ethics and the intimacy of moral national communities

Miller (1995, ch.3) emphasizes the ethical function of nationality. While democracy emphasizes the idea that everybody can participate in the debate on how to organize their community, nationalism asserts the principle that we also care for each other. In that sense, nations are moral communities in which the general interests of the group are also part of individual interests. In a nation, an individual citizen does not have to behave rationally or in a strategic way when s/he does a favour for a fellow citizen; making a contribution to the collective body is not an outright loss when concrete gains are not immediately in sight. Rather, s/he knows that his or her contribution helps to sustain a set of relationships from which s/he stands to benefit to some degree (Miller 1995, 67).

For Haugaard (2006, 350) nationalism also rescues the modern human being from debilitating ontological insecurity. According to Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992), modernity entails increasing reflexivity, which, in turn, requires social actors to find permanent justifications of their everyday social practices—something that undermines their taken-for-granted knowledge. While the fate of the modern human being is no longer predetermined by family lineage and can be influenced by actors’ individual choices, such a situation might overburden an individual. In such cases, nationality constitutes an ontological safety net, and becomes what Haugaard (2006, 350) calls an inherent being-in-the-world. Put differently, democracy stands, on the one hand, for the idea that people are the sovereign body and have the right to take decisions. And on the other hand, democracy is also related to the liberal tradition according to which the human being stands on his/her own, and has the capacities to make rational decisions. Since a person is also a social human being, such a situation bears the danger of alienation and solitude. It is the nation that gives human beings a sense of belonging, offers rescue from alienation, solitude and anonymity (cf. Tamir 1995, 433-35; Greenfeld 1992, 487-88; Calhoun 2003, 546-50).

Following from this line of thought, nationalism creates solidarity—not only as prerequisite for a functioning democracy, as we will see below, but also as an end in itself. For that reason, many have argued that the nation has assumed the role of religion for modern societies (for an overview of these arguments see Smith 1998, ch.5). Tamir (1993, 36) goes even further and asserts that ‘membership in a national culture is part of the essence of being human.’ Living within a national community is not only of value to individuals. The national community provides a framework for an individual to become an autonomous self-determining actor, and to effect governance. As Tamir puts it, ‘[l]ife in a cultural environment that is familiar, understandable and thus predictable, is a necessary precondition for making rational choices and becoming self-governing.’ (Tamir 1993, 84)

In that regard, Ringmar (1998) speaks of the intimacy of nationalism. The modern citizen is not only a rational actor, but also an interior man who seeks to reveal himself in public. In earlier times, there was a strict separation between private and public life, and intimate personal relationships only existed in the former. The ‘public self’ was nothing that an individual ‘had,’ but something that was created: ‘It was never a question of “expressing oneself” in public, but instead a question of creating a public self which was expressive.’ (Ringmar 1998, 539). In other words, in public people behaved like actors on a stage. Modernity brought about the idea of living authentic lives—erasing the distinction between the private and public spheres, and making the latter as intimate and ‘true’ as the former. The intimization of the public sphere also led to a new conception of politics. From this point onward, politicians could not only be assessed on the basis of their policies, but also with regard to their personal qualities. Both self-expression in public and the new conception of politics have only become possible as people have begun to share a common cultural background, and to interact with others like themselves.

In light of these arguments, nations appear as moral communities, becoming much more than a simple decision-making apparatus. Walzer (1983, ch.2) draws parallels between nations and other autonomous units, such as neighborhoods, clubs and families. In this sense, nations are like families whose members are morally connected to people they have not chosen, but to whom they offer a refuge in times of troubles. This implies that we have the same special obligations towards our co-citizens that we would have towards family members. At the same time, however, we do not owe the same duties and rights to those who are not members of our community. Like clubs, nations also have selection committees that establish general qualifications for membership and numerical quotas. Defining how many and which people are accorded membership status depends upon both material and ideological aspects. Regarding the latter, drawing cultural boundaries is closely related to the question of how we define our nation. Given the intimate nature of nations, it appears obvious that citizens of a nation are not willing to let in just anybody, and that they prefer those people who are similar to them. However, it should also be noted that the nation constitutes such an important framework for our individual lives that we should be very much interested in who can participate in shaping our future. As Macedo (2007, 74) points out, in a nation-state we collectively make hugely consequential decisions. It is therefore in our interest and even our right to decide who can become a full member of this community.

Solidarity, trust and participation

One of the basic arguments of those who see a close link between democracy and nationalism is that the former only functions in a delimited space. As a matter of fact, there has so far never been a democratic regime that embraces the entire world. Rather, democracies almost exclusively exist within nation-states. The general argument behind this is that a democratic system only functions if its constitutive parts (i.e., the citizens) ‘believe in the system.’ According to Almond and Verba (1989) this can mean either identification with a system (affective believes), or support of the system (evaluative believes). Similarly, Easton (1965) speaks of diffuse and specific support as distinguishing between the legitimacy of a system and the support of concrete actions and performances of the system. ‘Belief in the system’ is especially high, for example, when one is proud of the nation that embraces the system, if one has a strong national identity, or if one attributes
importance to democratic values (see Dalton 1999, 58-9). At the same time, however, any system is in peril if it becomes too polarized (Dahl 1971, ch.7). While democracy is by definition a system in which people deliberate and struggle with each other over the question of how to organize themselves, it should be noted that a democratic regime is also prone to collapse if the conflicts become too severe. Dahl (1971, 106-7) mostly considers the following aspects of difference: class, religion, language, race/ethnic group, and region. Among these, he considers ethnic and religious especially fraught with danger, particularly if they are also tied to region (Dahl 1971, 108).

In a similar vein, Miller (1995, 97) argues that if a democracy is to function, ‘citizens should be willing to moderate their claims in the hope that they can find common ground on which policy decisions can be based.’ This common ground is guaranteed by nationalism. In Miller’s statement regarding nationalism, he does not understand culture in the more narrow sense (ethnic or racial homogeneity) but rather culture in the larger sense, i.e., common ideas on how to organize a society or what he calls a common sentiment of nationality. He takes this argument from Mill (1972) who has already stated that ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’ (quoted in Miller 1995, 98). By this, Mill thought less of things like common language or religion so much as the ideas of espousing similar political views and respecting one another’s good faith.

Moore (2001a,b) identifies two democratic mechanisms whose functions are facilitated when people share a common identity: representation and participation. When the nationalist and democratic revolutions at the end of the 18th century onwards transformed the people into the new sovereign body, an important principle of this transformation lay in the fact that the rulers of the nation (the government or the parliament) represented the interests of the people. In prior times, systems of sovereignty had been predicated on the endorsement of a monarch by God, and the kings and queens often belonged to families that had no direct connection to the territory they ruled and did not even speak the language of their subjects. In today’s democracies, people elect politicians with whom they identify and whom they trust to know their interests.

The notion of being ‘well represented’ by an elected official might also exist in highly divided societies, at times when each group gets the opportunity to elect its own representatives for the national government and parliament. However, a functioning democratic system also requires that its constituents identify with the elite in general, and that these constituents accept the elite’s decisions even when they do not belong to the decision-making majority. Indeed, Tocqueville (1961) has asserted that in a well-functioning democracy, the outvoted minority accepts the majority decisions. At the same time, however, the majority will try to respect the interests of the minority as much as possible, and refrain from upsetting them. This dynamic only functions if the interests of majority and minority groups are not too disparate, and if the various groups consider their counterparts as part of the same society (see also Miller 1995, 94-5).

The second mechanism identified by Moore (2001a, b) concerns political participation. Miller (1995; 2000) has already argued that the role of nations is not limited to telling us who is allowed to participate in the democratic process. Defending the idea of republican citizenship, he argues that a good democracy is one whose citizens are actively engaged in politics. In his view, this engagement necessitates a shared national identity among the participants, which in turn provides motivation for cooperation. Moore (2001a, 95) refers to Kymlicka, who holds that a common language is crucial for democratic politics, as the average citizen only feels comfortable debating political issues in his or her own tongue. In a similar way, Schnapper (2004) asserts that language is not only an identity marker but, primarily, an instrument of democracy. To emphasize this argument she refers to Anderson (1991[1983]), who argued that the invention of the printing press and the diffusion of a common culture through a common language were essential for the construction of nations.

According to some authors, a shared nationality does more than promote general political participation; it also provides the foundation for an individual’s commitment to the nation and, in particular, an individual’s willingness to support the welfare state. An important aspect of this dynamic—one that serves as an underpinning for solidarity, and that is also encouraged by nationalism—is trust. Miller (1995) holds that for a democracy to function well, its citizens must trust each other. After all, trust is necessary when we choose politicians to represent our interests, or when we (financially) support fellow citizens: ‘Much state activity involves the furthering of goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary co-operation of citizens. For this activity to be successful, the citizens must trust the state, and they must trust one another to comply with what the state demands of them.’ (Miller 1995, 90-1). Trust can only exist between two persons if they can be sure that they both agree on basic values, and that they share a mutual respect for each other’s interests. Accordingly, minorities in a nation have to feel that they get a fair deal from the majority, and that no one is permanently going to be a winner or a loser. On the topic of the welfare system, Kymlicka (1995, 175) persuasively establishes the idea that a modern democracy ‘depends not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens.’ Such qualities include the ability to tolerate and to cooperate with people who are different from oneself; the willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in making economic demands, and a sense of commitment to a fair distribution of resources. In the absence of a common culture, those mechanisms are at risk.

Gellner (1983) is less concerned with political than with economic aspects and argues that nations are indispensable, as an industrial country needs cultural standardization—especially since work is no longer essentially manual, as it was in pre-modern society, and is now mainly semantic. Moreover, work has become both specialized and standardized—a trend that requires a minimum degree of literacy for communication. In Gellner’s (1983, 33-4) words ‘a society has emerged based on high-powered technology and the expectancy of sustained growth, which requires both a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in
a standard idiom and writing when required.’ In that sense, nationalism did not impose homogeneity, ‘it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism’ (Gellner 1983, 39). From another perspective, it seems obvious that when some people do not want to be part of the nation, this leads to unproductive tensions and violence (Lustick 1993). Moreover, if questions of ethnic attachment and belonging become dominant—in the job market, for example—merit and transparency may become less important which, in turn, effects the efficiency and competency of industrial states (Moore 2001a, 79).

Part II: The Competing Logic

Doubting the integrative force of nationalism

Among those who refute the complementary logic of democracy and nationalism, three groups can be distinguished. First, there is a group that doubts that nationalism leads to more solidarity and trust within society, and that questions the empirical validity of these arguments. Second is the group that much more radically warns of the exclusionary and even deadly consequences of democratic regimes that embrace nationalist ideologies. And at a normative level, the third group is composed of scholars who criticize the moral consequences of nationalist exclusion.

A very comprehensive criticism of the complementary logic of nationalism and democracy has been provided by Abizadeh (2002). According to his arguments, having a culturally homogenous nation may at best reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur. However, he fears that nationalist politics might have negative side-effects, and effectively undermines social integration. Generally speaking, the argument of the alleged link between social justice and nationhood seems to imply that solidarity and trust cannot be produced without cultural homogeneity (Özkirimli 2005, 76-81). In light of this idea, the question arises: How can one then, for example, explain that welfare states do also work in multicultural societies?

As we have seen, Miller (1995) argues that a common culture is the basis for trust among citizens, which is in turn needed to remove barriers to non-strategic social actions. Moreover, a common culture also enables a transparent, unified public sphere of deliberation, which is in turn necessary for democratic forms of social integration. As for trust, Abizadeh (2002, 501) wonders whether it is really predicated upon another person sharing the same culture as another, or if it is based on whether a person has previously proven to be trustworthy. He gives the example of Chileans who trusted British and Spanish judges far more than Chileans judges when it came to trying Augusto Pinochet. Does this example refute Miller’s arguments? It is unclear whether Miller (1995) considers common culture a necessary condition for mutual trust, as Abizadeh attributes to him, or if Miller simply considers it an important variable for predicting trust. In the latter case, single examples would not disprove the general line of argumentation. The other question that arises from this example is, of course, whether the Chilean judges and the Chilean population really shared the same culture. As we have seen above, Miller (1995) seems to understand common culture to involve common political values, or a shared understanding of social justice. The Chilean example would thus strongly confirm Miller’s argument: The people in Chile do not trust their judges because they defend different political values.

Moore (2001, 82) observed that redistribution of taxes from rich to poor seems more pronounced in divided societies—like Canada and Belgium—than it does in the United States, where a sense of patriotism is stronger. This might provide some basis for arguing that multiculturalist policies actually ease possible tensions between heterogeneity and distribution, since people may start to think of members of other ethnic groups as equal to themselves. Another issue that arises from this line of thought is whether this causal relationship functions in only one direction. Lacroix (2004, 291) brings up the idea that social solidarity and redistribution among different nationalities helps to foster mutual identification.

In any case, the relationship between immigration and the welfare state is much more complicated than most of the studies so far cited have assumed. As Moore (2001a, 82) rightly points out, we must first account for the bureaucratic state structure and, second, for the kind of national identity that prevails in a state to understand this relationship. The bureaucratic structures serve as an intermediary in the relationship between national identity and the actual delivery of goods associated with social justice. Since such bureaucratic structures are inert and legally regulated, changes in the composition of the population and public sentiments are not immediately reflected in public policy. In addition, by referring to the example of the United States, Moore (2001a, 82) asserts that a strong tradition of patriotism might also lead to a weak record on social justice, if national identity is shaped by an individualistic ‘self-help’ tradition.

In response to the studies collected by Banting and Kymlicka (2006), which question the negative relationship between cultural heterogeneity and solidarity/welfare spending, Miller (2006) argues that the mechanisms are much more complicated than most empirical studies have suggested. In his opinion, it is not enough to simply look at the overall expenditures of the welfare state to investigate the impact of multiculturalism. Rather, analyses should mainly consider those elements of the welfare state that are redistributive. Indeed, Miller (2006) finds some evidence in Banting’s and Kymlicka’s (2006) volume that the citizens of a multicultural state support policies that protect against risks, such as accident or illness, that benefits all citizens. At the same time, those citizens might oppose policies such as housing subsidies and income supplements, which go to the worse-off immigrants. According to Myles and St-Arnaud (2006), it is insufficient to stop with cultural heterogeneity when striving to understand the development of the welfare state. A generalized welfare-state retrenchment can be observed when ethno-racial diversity generates ethno-racial division, and is instrumentalized by right-wing populists.
Abizadeh (2002, 502-4) also criticizes Miller’s (1998) expectation that a ‘shared culture’ facilitates communication in the public sphere. Accordingly, common values should not necessarily lead to a large consensus on any important questions. Rather, they should determine the rules of the debate and foster the individuals’ capacity to predict the actions of other individuals. Again, Abizadeh (2002, 502) concedes that the transparency engendered by common culture might facilitate political deliberation. However, he doubts that those are necessary conditions for liberal democracy. Additionally, according to his argument, such a perspective assumes that nations or cultural groups in general are mutually exclusive entities, whose boundaries are impenetrable. As a matter of fact, however, representatives of various nations successfully communicate with each other. Furthermore, a large majority of migrants successfully integrate themselves into new cultural environments. Abizadeh (2002, 503) also rejects more straightforward arguments about cultural homogeneity, according to which people must speak the same language in order to communicate with each other. While this might be true at the face-to-face level, at the societal level, democratic deliberation can be mediated via multilingual media and official representatives can rely on interpreters. Moore (2001a, 96-8) points out that linguistic divides can be alleviated by elite-accommodation, i.e., when the elite speaks more than one language and shares similar political values. She refers to a series of power-sharing and consociational arrangements that have already been applied in the past to ensure democratic governance in multinational states (Moore 2001b, 8-14; see also Lijphart 1977; Reilly 2001; Keating 2001; Horowitz 2003; Caminal and Requejo 2008). Moreover, the ‘common-language-argument’ only holds if people speaking the same language automatically communicate with each other and start to share the same values. As a matter of fact, many languages are spoken in multiple countries, and members of secessionist movements often speak the same language as the citizens of the country from which they like to separate themselves.

Finally, Abizadeh (2002, 504-7) also rejects Gellner’s ‘industrial society argument.’ While he agrees that an industrial society requires an educational system that trains its students in a set of common technical and communication skills, he doubts that the cultivation of these competencies requires students to have a single culture or even a common language. On the contrary, for a modern industrial society to profit from economic and industrial innovations (and thereby promote economic growth) it must work to promote these innovations. This growth is guaranteed most effectively when that society possesses a variety of different sources to promote growth and industry. How many stories are there of immigrants with innovative ideas who have successfully conceived and built up new companies? In a similar vein, one would be remiss to argue that federal states where the school system is decentralized are economically retarded. A final issue concerns the causal direction of Gellner’s argument: Might it also be that successful industrial development leads to cultural homogenization?

**Exclusionary and deadly democracy**

Abizadeh also warns us that cultural nationalist policies might have effects that are contrary to those preached by Miller and others. In particular, he questions the necessity of promoting national homogeneity, and suggests that attempts at enforcing this principle pose a threat to social order (Abizadeh 2002, 507). The systematic exclusion of those who do not belong to our nation might not only lead to a waning of solidarity and trust among ethnic groups, but even to tensions and deadly conflicts.

In the course of the French Revolution, citizenship came to be an inclusionary mechanism that made subjects into equal citizens. More generally speaking, these citizenship regulations have helped democracies to define who is part of a nation-state and allowed to participate in the democratic process. However, inclusion always implies a complementary boundary of exclusion. Group formation means boundary formation, and that some people will be excluded: ‘However widely the boundaries of the national community are imagined […] it remains a bounded community, with the large majority of the world’s population on the outside.’ (Wimmer 2006, 341). In a world with clearly bounded nations that are simultaneously states and democracies, such a delineating mechanism would be fine; each human being is a full member of one of the many polities. However, such an ideal world has never and will never exist. In truth, the citizens of one nation frequently move into other nations, and there are many states that are comprised of several ethnic groups. Not only does this lead to political problems—it also highlights the tensions (or at least the potential tensions) that exist between the underlying principles of democracy and nationalism.

Even if we agree that nationalism has an integrative function for democratic regimes, as is expressed above, it goes without saying that all those who are ‘too different’ are excluded and disallowed to participate in a democratic decision-making process. As long as those people are not automatically attributed the nationality of their new home country, external exclusion is supplemented with internal exclusion (Mackert 2006, 80). Nowadays permanent residents in western countries —‘denizens’ as they are often called—are more and more granted the same civic and social rights as citizens. The same does not hold true for political rights, however. At the national level in particular, participation in the democratic political process is still reserved for the citizens of the nation. Here, the mutually exclusive logics of citizenship and nationalism become most apparent. In many countries a considerable part of the population of a state is not included in the state’s decision-making process, as the democratic principle would require. Instead, these portions of the population are excluded on the grounds of their different nationalities. Those who criticise such situations most often refer to Dahl’s (1989: 121-2) proposition that “system Y is democratic in relation to everyone who is subject to its rules.” In other words, all those who are affected by a law should be integrated into the decision-making process.

Stepan (1994) discusses the competing logics of nationalism and democracy, invoking Estonia and its struggles to include and integrate its large Russian minority. After independence, the big question facing Estonians was whether or not Russians living on their territory could be regarded as full citizens of their state. There were moments when inclusive definitions of citizenship prevailed, and polls showed that ethnic Russians
were willing to become loyal citizens. In the end, however, citizenship was too narrowly defined, making it impossible for most Russians to become full members of the Estonian state. Estonians remained generally unconvinced that Russians could become Estonians. According to Stepan (1994, 135), this restrictive citizenship policy could be explained in the light of history and the grievances and injustices of the past. However, it may also be explained by a more general argument. Indeed, the logic of a nation makes it virtually impossible to argue for a broad definition of citizenship. For Stepan, ‘the logic of the nation-state has produced a political language and a set of descriptive terms whose discursive effect is to create polar identities and to work against the multiple complementary identities to make democratic life in a de facto multi-national state possible.’ (Stepan 1994, 135; his emphases).

In other words, nationalism does not enable democracy, as some have argued; in fact, it can be argued that nationalism makes real democracy impossible. The argument presented above—which emphasizes the idea that nationalism is needed to define who can participate in a democratic regime—may also be interpreted in another way, leading to the conclusion that it is completely non-democratic if a nation selects its members on basis of ethnic criteria. For Carens (1989: 40) a state that requires more than residence as precondition for full citizenship violates the principles of toleration and respect for diversity to which all liberal democracies should be committed.

Others argue that the fusion of the ethnos and the demos not only leads to contrary democratic effects—such as the exclusion form the democratic politics—but worse, to deadly conflicts and genocides. This idea is concisely expressed in the title of Mann’s book on the ‘Dark Side of Democracy’ (2005). Mann (2005, 2-3) argues that murderous cleansing is a modern phenomenon and has only become possible under a system in which democracy and nationalism have now become closely entangled. The basic idea behind this argument is that a democratic regime produces majorities and minorities. Throughout history we have observed how majorities tyrannize minorities. The fusion of a nation with a democratic regime encouraged the idea of founding the state upon ethnic homogeneity. This ethnicization of democracy has radicalized this mechanism, and led to the many atrocities that we have witnessed throughout the 20th century, including the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the wars in Yugoslavia, and the genocide in Rwanda.

Some criticize that Mann too easily contracts the concept of democracy into that of ‘majority rule’ thereby neglecting other functions of democracy such as the protection of minorities (Conversi 2006). Others think that his book is rather about the dark side of nationalism (Eatwell 2006: 272) or the dark side of the nation-state (Semenin 2006: 286). If genocides occur in democracies, it is not because modern nation-states resort to majority rule but because democracies become very nationalistic and adopt a very exclusionary form of nationalism. In any case, such debates reveal once more both the tension and closeness between nationalism and democracy. If Mann (2005; 2006: 290) says that murderous ethnic cleansing is the product of the aspiration to ‘rule by the people’, we remember from the beginning of this review that at least originally the ideas of peoplehood and sovereignty were part of both concepts of nationalism and democracy.

**National or global justice?**

Aside from the question of whether cultural homogeneity is a necessary condition for a functioning democracy, some authors have become increasingly interested in the moral aspects of excluding people from political decision-making processes and welfare-state benefits. Young (2000b, 157) concedes that citizens’ willingness to be taxed to pay for public services and distributions depends on their nationalist sentiments. She finds it very problematic, however, to make obligations contingent on sentiment, and refuses to accept that necessary conditions provide moral arguments for nationalism. In her opinion, we do not only have obligations to our co-nationals, and questions of justice cannot be decided exclusively by nations.

In describing her position, Young (2000a, 238-46) reconstructs three types of justification. First, to Miller’s argument—which suggests that national identification is the moral basis for obligation of justice—she rejoins that ‘[m]oral arguments for obligations of justice must rest on more objective and normative grounds than feelings of familiarity or cultural affinity.’ Moreover, she refers to the processes of nation-building in the course of which solidarities have been created among millions of distant strangers. This suggests that feelings of solidarity are not timeless and natural, and could be extended beyond the nation. Second, and in a similar way, she counters positivist justifications that make moral obligations, and that suggest justice is simply contingent on the existence of a particular political jurisdiction. Since the borders of nations have been changed at various points in time, there is no reason to believe that such change cannot and will not occur in the future. The third argument she challenges is not based on group identification, but justifies exclusive obligations to one another because living under a common constitution enables and fosters social and economic interactions. It is argued that we depend on and have special obligations to each other because we interact with each other. To this, Young replies that—especially in a globalized world—interactions between human beings are no longer restricted to co-nationals.

One of the principle aims of nationalist revolutions was to include the people in the political body, since it was considered unjust that those affected by political decisions had no say in the decision-making process. Today, a similar argument is put forward by those who criticize the exclusiveness of modern nations: Why are denizens not consulted on decisions that will affect them? Another principle of national revolutions was rooted in the idea that all human beings are equal and have the same rights and opportunities. Accordingly, and by referring to Beitz (1979), Young (2000a, 246-47) questions the moral right of states to keep and control the benefits derived from the natural resources that happen to lie within their borders. As much as it has been suggested that people should not have more rights or better chances in life simply because they were born...
into an aristocratic family, it can be considered as unjust when people lead a less comfortable life simply because they have been born in a poor country with a less developed welfare state. According to Abizadeh (2008), closed borders would only be acceptable under democratic protocols if they were justified to both citizens and foreigners; after all, both citizens and foreigners are affected by such a citizenship policy. In other words, the denial of border crossing or legal recognition of foreigners can only be ethically justified if it is the result of democratic processes that give participatory standing not only to citizens, but also to foreigners.

Opponents of completely open boundaries argue that people are only able to benefit from a system if they have contributed to it. And such a system, they assert, would face collective action problems under completely open borders. Nation-states producing a lot of benefits for their citizens would be desired by non-members and overwhelmed by free riders. In order to avoid this type of self-destroying model, specific criteria must be established and fulfilled before non-members can be accepted. Thus, citizens should have the right to control borders, as their interests are much more implicated than those of potential immigrants. Abizadeh (2008, 54) however, wonders whether citizens really have a greater stake than—for example—‘Africans who risk the treacherous waters between Morocco and Spain.’ (see also Rubio-Marin 2000: 42-59).

Free-rider problems have already been discussed in a historical setting—that of medieval towns. Brubaker (1992, 64-72) gives the example of German imperial legislation from the year 1530, which required every town and commune to nourish and lodge its poor. There was no doubt that each town was responsible for its municipal citizens. But did other inhabitants also belong to ‘its’ poor? In order to avoid a situation in which too many migrant poor would populate a territory, each town had to define who ‘its’ poor citizens were and, obviously, had an incentive to define membership as restrictively as possible. While it had sufficed for a long time to establish membership in a town simply by living there, from that time forward towns increasingly made membership contingent on possession of a formally approved domicile. This municipal reaction against the migrant poor was problematic insofar as it would displease the other towns that would have to house the outcast. For this reason, states began to interfere in communal citizenship. Not only were membership policies more and more coordinated at the state level, but practices of poor relief also became the responsibility of states. This development elevated the issue of citizenship definition and exclusion of the poor from the municipal to the state level. As the towns had done before, the state now had to define who ‘its’ poor were—setting criteria to define who would benefit from aid, and who would not. Also, as in the inter-communal disputes, states could no longer simply expel their poor without imposing costs on neighboring states. Numerous treaties between states at the beginning of the 19th century articulated the principle that states could only expel into the territory of another state a party who was a member of that second state.

The obvious question, now, is whether an even further shift—one that goes beyond the nation, to a more over-arching level—could feasibly be imagined. According to Young (2000a, ch.7), many issues of environmental damage and sustainability are global in their implications. Moreover, the scope and complexity of economic and communication systems constitute a sufficiently tight web of constraint and interdependence, one that allows us to think in terms of a global society. Consequently, principles of justice should be applied at the global level, and global regulatory capacities should be put in place. Young (2000a, ch.7) specifies that the global level of governance should be properly ‘thick,’ emphasizing that it should only lay down general principals and guidelines. As in a federal system, regional and local jurisdictions would be called upon to subsequently ‘thicken’ these guidelines into administrable programmes and rules.

**Conclusion and next steps to take**

In revising those works that question the necessity of cultural homogeneity for a democratic system to work, it becomes clear that the debate about whether nationalism and democracy are complementary or competing logics is more a question about degrees than completely opposite positions. In Abizadeh’s discussion, it appears that he does not completely reject the idea that a shared culture (at least in certain circumstances) contributes to a better functioning of democracy. He mainly disapproves of the argument that nationalism provides a necessary or the only basis for democratic decision-making processes. In a similar way, Moore (2001a, 85) has pointed out that it would be too crude to claim that more nationalism always leads to better democracy. Instead, it seems correct to say that a common national identity facilitates democratic governance. Finally, Young (2000a,b) recognizes the positive valence of the distinctness of peoples. She agrees with proponents of liberal nationalism such as Miller and Tamir, that the bloodlessness of cosmopolitan individualism fails to recognize that human beings are born into a community with a given history, a set of traditions and meanings. Nonetheless, she prefers to abandon the conception of nation and prefers to speak of ‘distinct people’, the distinctness of which emerges as a matter of degrees.

On the other hand, it also appears that those who emphasize the complementary logics do not adopt essentialist positions and do not necessarily speak of thick nationalism that requires a common language or religion for a democratic system. Indeed, most of them refer to thin nationalism that consists of common values concerning social justice. Miller in particular (1995) seems to require the latter form of nationalism. His conception of nationalism comes very close to the idea of democracy (1993, 7). This is made clear when he defines nations as ‘communities that do things together, take decisions, achieve results, and so forth.’ Miller’s citizens have an ‘active identity’ and create their own nation. In order for this to happen, people must believe in their goals, and consider one another as partners who can be trusted.
Similarly, Kymlicka (1995, 187) speaks of ‘shared political values’ that might favour social unity. He thereby relies on Rawls’ (1980, 540) claim that the source of unity in modern societies is a shared conception of justice. Kymlicka goes on to give the example of a 1991 Canadian government commission that developed a list of crucial values that are necessary for a political system to work. The list included criteria such as belief in equality and fairness, or a commitment to freedom, peace, and non-violent change. The main question Kymlicka focuses on, however, is whether such ‘shared values’ suffice to unify a nation and—in his particular inquiry—multinational states. He observes that many West-European countries share basic values with regard to social justice, and are similarly unwilling to completely reunit. Thus, it seems to him that a nation needs more than shared political values to succeed, and that a nation only functions when its constituent party also shares an identity (Kymlicka 1995, 188-89).

The question is however not simply whether civic nationalism is more compatible with democratic principles than ethnic nationalism or whether a democracy would fall apart if citizens had only a thin political and not a thick cultural identity. As has already been discussed at length, civic nationalism is not necessarily less restrictive than ethnic nationalism (Kaufmann 2000; Kuzio 2002) and in any case there are important analytical and empirical shortcomings with regard to this differentiation (Brubaker 1999; Helbling 2008: 41-5). What is at stake is more the degree of openness/closeness to guarantee the functioning of a democratic system without undermining its basic principles. Some scholars such as Rubio-Marin (2000) and Kostakopoulou (2008) even argue that the only criterion for becoming a member of a nation (besides the absence of a criminal record) is residency and/or the subjective intention to reside indefinitely in a country. Such questions are discussed in those works that I subsumed under the category B2 in Figure 1 and that are concerned with citizenship laws and their regulatory function in either fostering or inhibiting a nation’s cultural heterogeneity. Another important group of works that could be the focus of a related review article is concerned with how manifest cultural heterogeneity can be regulated and potential negative effects of cultural heterogeneity be avoided by means of specific institutional arrangements (B2 in Figure 1). And, finally, there are those researchers that are more specifically concerned with empirically observable effects of cultural heterogeneity, citizenship regulations, and institutional arrangements (C in Figure 1).

The next steps to take should, however, not only be concerned with reviewing related topics but also with solving the problems that have been raised throughout this paper. A promising way could be to make the basic logics of nationalism and democracy more compatible. As we already know, nationalism is not necessarily about exclusion, or related inextricably to xenophobia and ethnic conflicts. Calhoun (2007, 1) argues that, while it is often implicated in atrocities and discriminatory practices, ‘nationalism is not a moral mistake.’ He asserts that we should not underestimate the work done by nationalism and national identity in organizing human life and politics. Nationalism is not necessarily about ethnic purity and cultural uniformity, he states. It can also be considered to provide an arena for public debate and culture-making.

This does not mean, however, that nations constitute the end-all basis of politics. The large majority of researchers in the field of nationalism who espouse a constructivist perspective would agree that, first and foremost, nations are products of politics, and, accordingly, those nations can always be the objects of new political projects. Thus, if we consider democracy as a system in which people struggle over the question of how to organize themselves, these struggles can also include the question of what constitutes the nation, and how cultural boundaries should be drawn. Consequently, democracy and nationalism constitute not complementary but rather mutually dependant logics in the sense that nationalism tells us who is allowed to participate in a democratic system, and democracy constitutes a process during which the cultural boundaries of a nation are defined.

References

