

Game Theory and Society

Models of Social Interaction in Sociological Research
ETH Zürich (Switzerland), July 27-30, 2011

The aim of the conference is to explore the potential of game theory for sociological theory and its application to sociological research broadly considered. For this purpose the conference brings together scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds to focus on topics of game theory relevant to sociology and society at large.

Organizers

Andreas Diekmann, Dirk Helbing, Ryan O. Murphy

Plenary Speakers

- Andreas Diekmann
- Hartmut Esser
- Ernst Fehr
- Urs Fischbacher
- Andreas Flache
- Herbert Gintis
- Jacob Goeree
- Rainer Hegselmann
- Dirk Helbing
- Ralph Hertwig
- Manfred Milinski
- Ryan Murphy
- Jorge Pacheco
- Werner Raub
- Brian Skyrms
- Karl Sigmund
- Chris Snijders
- Ramzi Suleiman
- Roberto Weber
- Rolf Ziegler



Support

The "Game Theory and Society" conference is supported by ETH Zürich, the Section "Models and Simulation" of the German Sociological Association (DGS), and the Future and Emerging Technologies Programme FP7-COSI-ICT of the European Commission. The organizers are grateful for financial support from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2011) under grant agreement no. 248438 (project "QLectives").



	Wednesday, July 27	Thursday, July 28	Friday, July 29	Saturday, July 30	
9:00-9:45		Parallel Sessions (CAB Building)	Parallel Sessions (CAB Building)	Andreas Flache: The Weak Side of Informal Social Control	
9:45-10:30				Ralph Hertwig: Simple Heuristics in a Social World	
10:30-10:45		Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	
10:45-11:30				Urs Fischbacher: Lies in Disguise – On Honesty and Deception	
11:30-12:15				Ramzi Suleiman: Self-favoring and Other-Favoring in Repeated Two-Person Interactions	
12:15-13:00		Lunch (CAB)	Lunch (CAB)	Ryan Murphy: Measuring Other Regarding Preferences	
13:00-14:00	Conference Registration (in front of HG G60)		Poster Session (CAB)		
14:00-14:45	Andreas Diekmann: The Emergence of Social Norms Among Heterogeneous Actors	Herbert Gintis: Analytical Foundations of Sociological Game Theory	Werner Raub: Trust and Social Embeddedness		
14:45-15:30	Ernst Fehr: Human Nature and Social Interaction – Behavioral & Analytical Foundations of Sociology	Brian Skyrms: Naturalizing the Social Contract	Roberto Weber: Leadership and Credibility in Games		
15:30-15:45	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break		
15:45-16:30	Manfred Milinski: Humans prefer establishing pool punishment to maintain the commons	Jacob Goeree: The 1/d Law of Giving	Hartmut Esser: The Model of Frame-Selection: Towards a General Theory of Action		
16:30-17:15	Jorge Pacheco: Evolutionary Dynamics of Climate Change under the Collective Risk Dilemma	Dirk Helbing: Cooperation, Norms, and Conflict: Towards Simulating the Foundations of Society	Rainer Hegselmann: From small groups to large groups. Modeling Hume’s moral and political theory		
17:15-18:00	Rolf Ziegler: The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski – Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System	Chris Snijders: Schelling's Segregation Model. An Overview of 40 Years of Follow up Studies	Karl Sigmund: A Theoretical Approach to Institutionalized Incentives of Public Good Games: When Leviathan meets the Social Contract		
19:30-22:30		Conference Dinner on the Lake	tba		
Rooms	Aula (HG G60)	Audimax (HG F30)	Aula (HG G60)		Aula (HG G60)

Thursday Parallel Sessions

Thursday Stream I	Thursday Stream II	Thursday Stream III
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	“Social Norms”	“Social Preferences”	“Evolutionary Game Theory”
9:00-9:30	Fabian Winter: The Emergence of Norms from Conflicts over Just Distributions	Devesh Rustagi: Leader Social Preferences and Group Performance: Experimental Evidence From Ethiopia	Ruben Requejo: The Joker Effect: Cooperation driven by Destructive Agents
9:30-10:00	Heiko Rauhut: Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: An Experiment on Normative Compliance	Christoph Graf: Parameters of Social Preference Functions: Measurement and External Validity	André Martins: The Importance of Random Effects in Evolutionary Games
10:00-10:30	Yu Tongkiu: Social Norms, Costly Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation	Güther Kainz: Do self-reported Strategies Match Actual Behavior in Social Preference Experiments?	Floria, Mario: Selective Advantage of Tolerant Cultural Traits in the Axelrod-Schelling Model
10:30-10:45	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break
10:45-11:15	Axel Franzen: Testing the External Validity of Giving in the Dictator Game	Andreas Tutic: A Theory of Status-Mediated Inequity Aversion	Luis Martinez: Invasion Dynamics in Iterative Games
11:15-11:45	Gerald Schneider: Groupthink: Theory and Evidence	Michael Maes: Negative Social Preferences in Intergroup Settings	Matt Zimmermann: The Cultural Evolution of Intergroup Conflict: Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory
11:45-12:15	Kurt Ackermann: Predicting Contribution Levels in an Anonymous One-shot Public Goods Game	Sonja Vogt: Thin Slices of Preferences: Predicting Strategic Behavior Given Limited Information	Jesus Gomez-Gardenes: Evolutionary Games Defined at the Network Mesoscale: The Public Goods Game
Session Chair	Stefan Pickl	Wojtek Przepiorka	Stefan Wehrli
Room	CAB G 11	CAB G 61	CAB G 59

Friday Parallel Sessions

	Friday Stream I	Friday Stream II	Friday Stream III
	“Reputation / Signaling”	„Networks / Spatial Games“	“Inequality”
9:00-9:30	Martin Abraham: The Emergence of Reputation in Economic Transactions	Hans Haller: Network Extension	Ulf Liebe: The Power of Both: Reciprocity and Social Status
9:30-10:00	Yutaka Nakai: In-Group Favoritism Based on Tag and Reputation in Group	Berno Büchel: Forming Opinions in Social Networks: The Effects of Strategic Interaction	Marc Keuschnigg: Solving Cooperation Problems in Heterogeneous Groups
10:00-10:30	Wojtek Przepiorka: Is Charitable Giving a Costly Signal of Cooperative Intent? Decomposing the Benefits of Altruistic Acts	Fabio Tufano: Does Oneness Explain Coordination? An Experimental Study on the Importance of Relationship Closeness for Coordination Success	Stephan Schosser: The Public Loss Game - An Experimental Study of Public Bads
10:30-10:45	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break
10:45-11:15	Amrish Patel: Does Category Reporting Increase Donations to Charity? A Signaling Game Approach	Vincenz Frey: Embedding Trust in Information-exchange Relations: A Game-theoretic Model for Investments in and Returns on Social Capital	Joel Berger: The Logic of Relative Frustration. Boudon’s Sociological Theory and Experimental Evidence
11:15-11:45	Károly Takács: The Viability of Fake Signaling and Cooperation in Structured Populations	Jelena Grujic: Prisoner’s Dilemma on a Sizeable Network: Experiment and Theory	Flaminio Squazzoni: Does Incentive Provision Increase the Quality of Peer Review? A Game-Theory Experimental Study
11:45-12:15	Thomas Gautschi: A Nash Bargaining Model for Exchange Networks	Dirk Semmann: Interacting with Several Social Partners Decreases Cooperation	Hendrik Vollmer: What kind of game is everyday interaction?
Session Chair	Heiko Rauhut	Thomas Grund	Kurt Ackermann
Room	CAB G 11	CAB G 61	CAB G 59

Poster Session

- Wen-Lin Chiou: An Intuitive Interpretation of Players' Behavior in Multi-Choice Games When the Shapley Value is Adopted
- Katrin Fehl: Co-evolution of Behavior and Social Network Structure Promotes Human Cooperation
- Jürgen Fleiss: Inequality and Behavior. An Invisible-hand Game Experiment with Asymmetric Payoffs
- Jobst Heitzig: Keeping Climate in Check: A Self-enforcing Strategy for Cooperation in Public Good Games
- Chih-Ru Hsiao: Modeling a Multi-Choice Cooperative Game Based on the Law on Equal Job Opportunities
- Thomas Jensen: Group Based Regret and Collective Action
- Ekaterina Melnikova: Queueing Problems in Service Management: A Game-theoretic Model
- Miriam Mezger: Experimental Results on Recommendation Behavior of Consumers and Managers and the Impact on Product Choice
- Arleta Mietek: Budgeting and Performance Evaluation - Nothing but Lies?
- Igor Kanovsky: Opinion Spreading in Social Networks: 0-1-2 Model.
- Isamu Okada: Replicator Dynamics Analysis of Risk Choice Game
- Hitoshi Yamamoto : Evolution of Cooperation by Defection in the Metanorms Game

Friday, 13-14h, Room CAB 10.5